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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STAT:J OF UTAH 
S'f.i\'rE ()}1, UTi\ I I, By and 1,hrough 
Its l{oad Cotnmission, 
l)laintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
BE~ DA \'"IS et ux et al, 
Defendants and Respondents~ 
ll(>X.L\LD \\r. L.~1.Y'l.,ON et ux, 
Defe·ndant and Appellant. 
APPELL~TS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
10112 
An action by the Utah State Road Commission 
to condemn various property interests in Irving Park 
Addition, Salt Lake County. 
DISPOSITIOX IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court disregarded directives in Utah Code 
and entered judgment for respondents concerning lot 
3 
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19 Block 7, Irving Park Addition. Trial court denied 
motion for new trial. 
RELIEF SOUGH'!" ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek an order reversing lower court's 
judgment and an order directing the lower court to set 
compensation for the property interest owned by ap-
pellants and taken by plaintiff as set forth in the demand 
for judgment of plaintiff's complaint. 
STATEMEN'I, OF FACTS 
Following the year 1956 appellants purchased 
various lots in Irving Park Addition. In the acquisition 
of these lots appellant had occasion to discuss the 
method of acquiring land, on which there was delin-
quent taxes, with an attorney who represented to ap-
pant that he had offices at 141 East 2nd South and a 
client who was also interested in such acquisitions.! 
In the spring of 1958, appellant, in examining 
the records in the County Recorder's office pertaining 
to said subdivision, found that respondent Mr. Davis 
had succeeded in acquiring deeds to lot 19 Block 7, 
Irving Park Addition. As the lot in question stood in 
the name of James L. Turner and appellants were 
also looking for this man or his heirs to clear title to 
additional land in another area which appellants were 
1. Return address from body of Davis' and Neilson's deeds,. shown 
in title report contained in record, is same address where ap-
pellants had discussion. 
4 
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inten·stt·d in, appellants began checking to see if the 
grantor ,J :unes Blair 'furner \Vas connected. Upon the 
firuling- that .James L. 'furner \vas deceased and had 
oue son, James Blair Turner, and one daughter, ~Iae 
Elaine 'furner, appellant was convinced that these 
"'t•re the proper people to conYey the title that had 
descended to them from their father, James L. Turner. 
Upon approaching Mr. '_rurner, appellant dis-
covered that he kne\\· ~Ir. Turner personally, though 
not by n:une. 'Vhen in the course of the conversation 
concerning the signing of the deed to Mr. Davis, the 
appellant asked ~Ir. Turner why his wife had not 
joined in signing the deed to Mr. Davis. Mr. Turner 
replied that the gentleman offered no extra compensa-
tion for her signature as he thought she had no claim, 
therefore she did not join with him in signing the deed. 
A\ppellant, ha,·ing bought and sold two or three parcels 
of land knew a 'vife's signature was necessary and 
questioned )lr. Turner further. Mr. Turner said that 
if nppellant would like to buy his wife's interest, he 
C~Ir. Turner) would give the appellant the abstract 
to the lot his father had left them also. As evidenced 
by the title report, this offer was accepted by appellant 
and ~Ir. 'rurner and his "·ife signed the deed as shown 
by the record. I 
4-\ppellants recorded the deed from the Turners 
concerning this lot Jan. 8, 1960, and shortly there-
after had occasion to inform ~Ir. Clarence Williams 
1. No. 7 page 3 of Title Report. 
5 
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of the Right of Way Department of the Utah State 
Road Commission of the interest they claimed. 
As negotiations between the parties broke down, 
plaintiff filed this action and served appellants on April 
4, 1963. Appellants read contents of complaint and 
res.pondent's answer filed April 23, 1963 and declined 
to file answer since they were satisfied at that time that 
their interests were recognized although not in full 
compliance with the law.1 Respondents in their answer 
(paragraph I) admitted appellants had some interest 
in the parcel in question.as set forth in paragraphs No. 
6 and 7 of plaintiff's complaint. On or about July 29, 
1963 plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Service was 
made on appellants on July 31, 1963. This, appellants 
read, agreed with, then checked respondent's answer 
to amended_complaint which admitted appellants' claim 
again in paragraph No. 2. Appellants still being satis-
fied, again declined to file an answer. 2 
Hearing nothing more, appellants had no knowl-
edge of Trial Court's actions until Dec. 10·, 1963 when 
appellants again checked the record and much to their 
surprise, now found that their claim as pertains to lot 
19 block 7, Irving Park Addition, had been the subject 
of discussion at pretrial on Nov. 4, 1963 where it had 
been the ruling of the pretrial court that appellants 
could be barred. Trial was set for Dec. 18, 1963, but 
judgment was entered Dec. 11, 1963. 
1. 78-34-9 Directs Court in granting orders of immediate occu-
pancy. 
2. Rule 54 (c) (2) Limits of default judgments. 
6 
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and 
l T pon reading the foll<nving statements: 
·· i\ t the titne of the pretrial, it was the ruling 
of the !)retrial l~ourt that if the Davises would 
t'stahlish their chain of title at the time of the 
trial. that would be all that would be necessary to 
bar I..~aytons from making any claim in this ac-
t ion and Ln vtons are in default in this action 
and .their <lef:~ult is entered. Title may be proven 
in the Da vises by a certified title report from a 
duly licensed title company." (From page 3 of 
pretrial order) 
"'I'he fee simple title to lot 19 block 7 was in 
1\. P. Neilson, but subject to encumbrances 
sho\\·n in Schedule B." (From page I of Title 
Report). 
nppellants decided that in order to preserve their rights 
in the n1a.tter, they had best enter an appearance. There-
fore on Dec. 17, 1963 appellants filed a motion to set 
aside j udg1nent as pertains to lot 19 block 7, Irving 
Park ..:\ddition. and also an answer to plaintiff's com-
plaint. This motion stated the grounds for appellants' 
clain1 to said lot. A hearing was held and the motion 
was granted . .L~ trial "Tas set for Jan. 29, 1964. At this 
trial appellants found respondents again denying the 
validity of appellants' claim to said lot CONTRARY 
TO THE AD:\IISSIONS MADE. IN RESPOND-
EX1.,S ..:\XS'\TER.1 As soon as the appellants ad-
nutted there had been four years elapse between date 
1. Nothing was indicated in answer that respondents claimed 
under a tax title or that their claim was adverse to appellant's 
claim. 
7 
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of redemption when taxes were paid by respondents! 
and the date this action was filed, the Court said appel-
lants were barred2 from ·making any further showing 
as to the validity of their claim. From this adverse and 
ultra vires holding, appellants made a motion for new 
trial or an amendment to proceedings) From a denial 
of this motion Feb. 27, 1964 and from the adverse judg-
ment, appellant appeals.· 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
Appellants were denied the options afforded by the 
law as the rules pertaining to default judgments and 
good pleadings were ignored. The Court committed 
ultra vires acts in adjudicating title when that question 
was not before the Court. 
1. The plaintiff and/or the Court erred in not fol-
lowing the directives as outlined in the following sec-
tions and Rules of Civil Procedure of Utah Code An- . 
notated 1953 as revised .. 
a. Section 1. to 14th Amendment to Constitution 
of the United States. 
" ... no state shall m·ake or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges of citizens 
... ; nor deny to any person 'vithin its juris-
1. Orie who is under a duty to pay taxes cannot add to or strength· 
en his title by purchasing the land at a tax sale. Hadlock v. 
Benjamin Drainage District 89 P 94, 53 P2d 1157. 
2. Contrary to Art. I, Sect. 11 Constitution of Utah. 
3. See Motion for New Trial filed Feb. 7, 1964. 
8 
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diction. the equal protection of the la,vs. 
(..t\gainst -t-year statute). 
h. Section :! • ..L\rticle 1, l 1 onstitution of Utah. 
". \ ll political power is inherent in the people 
nnd all free governtnents are founded on their 
authority for their equal protection and bene-
fit ... " (Against 4-year statute). 
c. Section 11, Article 1, Constitution of Utah. 
H 1\11 courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his ... property, 
shall have remedy by due course of law ... 
and no person shall be barred from prosecut-
ing or defending before any tribunal ... , by 
himself, any civil cause to which he is a party." 
(Against 4-year statute). 
d. Section 27, Article I, Constitution of Utah. 
"Frequent recourse to fundamental principles 
is essential to the security of individual rights 
" 
e. Section 7 4-4-3, Utah Code Annotated. 
Defines wife's interest in husband's property. 
(Also in statement of facts and motion Dec. 
17, 1963}. 
f. Section 76-20-10. 
Husband conveying as unmarried man. Pro-
tection given dower as dower has always been 
favorite in the law.1 Davis and Neilson took 
all the proceeds as in judgment Dec. 11, 1963, 
and never told of outstanding dower interest. 
''Then confronted by appellants, they changed 
story and resorted to ambiguous law for pro-
tection. ( 4-year statute). 
1. In Re. Madsen's Estate 123 U 329 point number 9. 
9 
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g. Section 78-34-9. 
Pertains to method of procuring order of im-
mediate occupancy. Bond is necessary to pro-
tect condemnee. Had the Court required com-
pliance with this procedure, respondents 
would not have had opportunity to claim ap-
pellant's share nor invoke ambiguous statute. 
h. Section 78-34-10 ( 1) . 
Compensation. How assessed. (Each interest 
must be ascertained) . 
i. Section 59-10-45. 
One who is under a duty to pay taxes cannot 
add to or strengthen his title by purchasing 
· the·land at a tax sale. (Hadlock v. Benjamin 
Drainage District 53 P2d 1157}. 
j. Section 59-5-12. 
Taxes must be assessed in name of owner if 
known. Appellants recorded deed properly so 
interest claimed by them was known to all. 
Apparently there are no taxes to be assessed 
against dower right and it is to be treated as 
life tenant and remainderman. 
· It is duty of assessor to assess all property 
at its value, and it is likewise duty of every 
person and corporation having taxable prop-
erty to list same for taxation. (Ut. ld. Sugar 
Co. v. S. L. County 60 U 491, 210 P 106, 27 
ALR 874}. 
A life tenant should be assessed as owner dur-
ing the continuance of life estate. ( Sheppick 
v. Sheppick 44 U 131,138 U 1169}. 
k. Section 78-39-1. 
If property held by cotenants, can have par-
tition. 
10 
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I. Section 78-39-2. 
Cotnplaint must set forth interest of all par-
tit·s specifieally anrl particularly if known to 
plaiutiff. (Statement of facts). 
111. Set' t ion 78-39-3. 
Parties tnust be named if of record and as rec-
ord shows. (Title report) . 
n. Section 78-39-30. 
l>rotection < )f contingent future rights. (Court 
n1ust protect) . 
o. Section 59-5-14. 
1\.ssessment of property of decedents. " 
and the payment of taxes made by either binds 
all the parties in interest for their propor-
tions." r\.s a matter of equity, the party en-
titled to present possession should also pay all 
the taxes during the time his right to posses-
sion is unimpaired. ( Sheppick v. Sheppick 
44 U 1311 138 P 1169). (Madsen's Estate 
123 u 327). 
p. Rule 7 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Limits question before the Court to that which 
is asked for in demand for judgment. (Toone 
Y. Oneil Const. Co. 40 U 265, 277, 121 P 10). 
q. Rule 52 (a)~ 
·· ... find the facts specially ... " (There was 
never a finding as to value of appellant's in-
terest}. The trial Court should not make find-
ings of fact "?here there is no evidence to sup-
port them. If it does so, judgment will be re-
Yersed. (Hathaway v. United Tintic Mines 
Co. 42 U 520, 132 P 388, 390). 
(Title report showing Neilson's title also 
sho,ved it encumbered by Layton's deed). 
11 
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It is the duty of the trial Court to find upon 
all material issues raised by the pleadings, 
and failure to do so is reversible error (Baker 
v. Hatch 70 U I, 257 P 673). 
Until the Court has found on all the material 
issues raised by the pleadings, the findings are 
insufficient to support a judgment. {Prows 
v. Hawley 72 U 444, 450, 271 P 31). 
r. Rule 52 (b) . 
Motion to amend may be made. Appellants 
tried to tell the Court that it had erred in mo-
tion filed Feb. 7, 1964. Court said appellants 
were barred by section 78-12-12.1. 
s. Rule 54 (c) ( 2) . 
Pertains to default judgments. After disobey-
ing this directive, does Court have jurisdiction 
over appellants who have been forced into 
Court to set the record straight? 
t. Rule 61 Error. 
In action for damages to coat left with de-
fendant for cleaning and repairing, instruc-
tion charging that if coat was unfit for use, 
jury should find for plaintiff, and also find 
that defendant be permitted to retain coat Wa8 
not proper subject for disposition~ but such 
error was beneficial, rather than prejudicial, 
to defendant. (Garff v. Myers Cleaning & 
Dyeing Co. 65 U 548, 238 P. 278) . 
Causes are not reversed for mere error. They 
are reversed for prejudicial error. Therefore 
to entitle appellant to pevail, he must show 
both error and prejudice. (Boyd v. San Pedro, 
L.A. & S.L. R. R. Co. 45 U 449, 146 P. 282). 
While burden is on appellant, not only to show 
12 
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error. but also prejudice offsetting some sub-
staulinl right, yet if he shows this, then the 
burden. or rather duty of going forward is 
east upon respondent to show by the record 
that conunitted error \vas not or could not 
have been of harmful effect. (Jensen v. Utah 
l{.lt. Co 7:! U 366, 270 P 359). 
()ne who induces the Court to charge some-
thing not the la,v, will not be heard thereafter 
to conlpl,in. (Hunter v. Wm. M. Roylance 
C'o . .t5 U 135, 143 P. 140). 
p. Rule 15 (b) 
\\rhen issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the par-
ties, they shall be treated in all respects as if 
they had been raised in the pleadings. (Issues 
consented to, limited by appellants motion of 
Dec. 17, 1963). 
l'losely related to this .rule is the well-settled 
doctrine that a litigant cannot come into court 
upon one theory and recover on another. (Free 
'y· Little 31 U 449, 88 P 407) . 
... \ ppellants call attention at this point to the reason 
for vacating the default judgment.1 Respondents will 
undoubtedly contend that by the order vacating Find-
ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment of 
Dec. 11, 1963, appellants gave permission to enlarge 
the question before the Court to one of quiet title. Were 
that the case, appellants would not be before the Court 
no\\· on appeal. Appellants have objected all the way. 
(lluehner Block Co. v-. Glezon 6 U2d 226, 410 P2d 
517). 
1. Motion filed Dec. 17, 1963 stating appellant's claims. 
13 
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POINT II 
The Court was prevented from hearing appellant's 
full story by the use of Section 78-12-5.1, ... 
Appellants were denied the equal protection of the 
law as there is no provision for the protection of holders 
of contingent or future rights in the four year short 
statutes. 
Holders of such legal rights, by the very nature 
of such rights, are denied the present possession to such 
property. Therefore holding such a law to be valid in 
this case is contrary to constitutional restraints. I 
78-12-5.1 " . . . with respect to actions brought or 
interposed ... or determine the ownership of real 
property against the holder of a tax title to such prop-
erty, no such action or defense shall be commenced or 
interposed more than four years after the date of the 
tax deed, conveyance ... unless the person commencing 
or interposing such action or defense has actually occu-
pied or been in possession within four years prior to 
commencement or interposition of such action or de-
fense." 
As to the phrase uHas actually occupied" from 
Section 78-12-5.1, the appellants are in confusion as 
to exactly what its meaning is. Just how does one go 
about occupying vacant property-much less when one 
does not have the right to possession at present? Appel-
lants, in the course of filling their adjacent lots with 
1. Section 1, 14th Amendment-Equal protection of law. 
14 
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till dirt and leveling same. have on numerous occasions 
bet.'n upon the lot in question. Does this fulfill the 
stu tutory requirement 1 Respondents did not fence, fill, 
grade. plo'r or in nny other manner change the character 
of the lot in question nor in any manner show an adverse 
claim to appellants. 
By its terms. this statute, contrary to most such 
statutes bars actions or defenses brought to overturn a 
tax title. 1 Construed as it was in this action its use 
hecnn1e not one of compliance by respondent of statu-
tory requirements to perfect their title, but as a bar2 
to prevent appellants from pointing out where the 
Court strayed from its jurisdiction and facts that would 
prevent its use in the first place. 
A holding to the words in this statute does not 
allo"· protection for contingent interests such as appel-
lant's claim.3 As has been pointed out in Madsen's 
Estate (123 U. 327), "The right of dower does not 
affect the sesien of the husband's grantee." Therefore 
as appellants have no right to present possession, how · 
can the fact that appellants were not in possession be 
held. against them.4 Had appellants brought an action 
\\·ithin four years, nothing would have been accom-
plished and the parties would be exactly where they 
1. To defeat a claim by the bar of the statutes of limitation is 
~ot a determination of a case u,pon its merits. (Goeltz v. Con-
tinental B & L Co. 5 U2d 204, 299 P2d 832). 
2. ~ticle I Section 11 Constitution of Utah. 
. . . and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or 
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party." 
3. Tor~nto v. Sheffield et al 222 P2d 594 point 2. 
4. Article 1, Section 2, Constitution of Utah. 
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were the date this action was filed. That is, appellants 
knew of the manner respondents cleared the taxes and 
what claim they had, and respondents knew of appel-
lants' claims. 
As a matter of equity, which, by Section 68-3-2 
Utah Code Annotated, must prevail over statutory en-
actments, this short statute is the height of absurdity. 
It enables one who is in possession of the real property 
in question to reap the benefits that are distributed 
freely to inhabitants of the taxing district while harshly 
holding against an owner of vacant property that is 
taxed to provide the benefits needed by the party in 
possession. Why should the legislature penalize the 
person who gets no benefits and protect the one who 
rides for free? 
This statute is not equal in its protection in that 
if a person buys a vacant piece of real estate under a 
tax title rather than one that is occupied by the 
owner, he merely has to pay the taxes for four years 
then presto, the land is practically his. If he does the 
same with one that is occupied, then what? Has the 
law given equal protection to the tax title buyer? He 
might even have to resort to litigation to recover his 
money while the other buyer is protected after a statu-
tory time lapse. Does he get the property? Not accord-
ing to these sections, nor does it in any way shed light 
upon the method of achieving equality. A statute which 
bars actions, after four years, for the recovery of real 
property sold by the County for the non-payment of 
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delinquent taxes, but \vhich does not bar an action for 
the recovery of real property when the former owner 
is in possession or actually occupies the property, is arbi-
trary, unreasonable, and unconstitutional since the 
differentiation between the two buyers bears no rea-
sonable relation to the purpose to be accomplished by 
the statute and is discriminatory to buyers who purchase 
tnx titles "'here the land is occupied or possessed by 
the tax debtor .1 
CONCLUSION 
.t\ppell~nts contend that due to an unconstitutional 
law (four year short statute), an attempt was made 
to deprive them of a property right in violation of 
Section I, _14th Amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion, and in variation to law as set forth in the statutes 
and in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure . 
. 
As is shown by the record and directed by law, 
appellants should have had their rights presented to 
the Court by counsel for the plaintiff, together with 
a fair appraisal of its worth before title could be di-
vested from them.2 
''Then individuals are claimants of the same lot 
as disclosed by the title report contained in the record 
1. Tor~nto v. Sheffield P 594 P2d point No. 3. 
2. Article 1. Section 7 Utah State Constitution. "No person to 
be ~eprived of property without due process of law." 
Article I, Section 22, Utah State Constitution. "Private prop-
erty not to be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation." 
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of this action, the presumption should be that each 
knows the facts and the law surrounding the acquisition 
and disposition of their respective shares. 
In the light of these facts, admissions in respond-
ent's answer, and directives given by statute, appellants, 
therefore, pray for an order reversing the lower Court's 
judgment and directing that Court to set compensation 
to be paid appellants in order to extinguish their claim 
and for their costs and any other further relief this 
Court sees fit to direct. 
After reading Toronto v. Sheffield, Crystal Lime 
and Cement Co. v. Robbins,1 and other cases pertinent 
to tax titles, it reminds one of the eminent English 
chemist who was seeking the universal solvent until 
one day the village nit wit confronted him with the 
question, "What are you going to keep it in?" 
Respectfully submitted, 
DONALD W. LAYTON 
For Self 
1. Crystal Lime and Cement Co. v. Robbins 116 U 314, 209 P2d 
~~Yef on petition for rehearing, Volume 594 No. 7134. 
Toronto v. Sheffield 222 P2d 594, Brief in Volume 594 No. 
7233, pages 3 7 and 38. 
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